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Abstract 
Using Cameroonian data, this paper investigates the effects of social network on job quality. Social network is 
measured in terms of using friends and relatives while looking for a job. As regards to job quality, two aspects have 
been taken into consideration: monetary job quality which is captured by wage and non monetary job quality which 
is captured by a combination of social protection and job security. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of social 
network as regard to job quality, we make use of both Heckman selection model and Ordered Logit model. Our 
findings contrast with previous studies. Job seekers who make use of social network do not necessarily get a good 
job. More precisely, while the users of social networks exhibit a wage premium, they also exhibit a low job quality 
in terms of social protection and job security. We also find that social network contributes to explain job quality 
differential according to gender and institutional sectors (formal versus informal). 
Keywords: Social Network, Job quality, Heckman selection model, Ordered Logit 
JEL Classification: C25; D01; J21 ; J31 
Résumé 
En faisant usage de l’enquête Camerounaise sur l’emploi et le secteur informel (EESI, 2005), le présent article se 
propose de questionner l’impact du réseau relationnel sur l’accès à un emploi de qualité. La qualité de l’emploi est 
appréhendée sous deux angles complémentaires : un angle monétaire (salaire) et un angle non monétaire 
(combinaison de la protection sociale et de la stabilité de l’emploi). Sur un plan méthodologique, il est fait usage 
respectivement du modèle de sélection de Heckman et d’un modèle Logit ordonné afin d’évaluer l’efficacité du réseau 
relationnel dans la perspective de l’obtention d’un emploi de qualité. Au terme de cette analyse, il ressort que l’usage 
du réseau relationnel ne mène pas nécessairement à l’obtention d’un emploi de qualité. De manière spécifique, si les 
usagers du réseau relationnel obtiennent une prime salariale, ils obtiennent cependant un emploi de mauvaise 
qualité au regard de la protection sociale et de la stabilité de l’emploi. 
Mots Clés : Réseau relationnel, Qualité de l’Emploi, Modèle de sélection de Heckman, Logit 
Ordonné 
Classification JEL: C25; D01; J21 ; J31 
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1 Introduction 
  Most of the papers in the social network literature draw the attention on the fact that 
networks convey useful information in the job search process such that individuals with larger 
networks should experience a high job arrival rate (Granovetter, 1994, Montgomery, 1991, Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson, 2004, Patacchini and Zenou, 2008). However, little attention has been 
devoted to the quality of the related jobs. Moreover, most of the empirical literature on social 
network is mainly confined to developed countries studies and very few have analyzed the role of 
social network in less developed countries’ labor markets in general, sub-Saharan Africa to be 
specific. Nevertheless, in the recent literature, Berardi (2009) addresses the issue of the 
relationship between social network and wage in Senegal’s labor market. While its concern is 
about a monetary aspect of job quality, namely wage, he left out the issue related to the non 
monetary aspect (social protection, job security, work hours etc). Now the influence of social 
network can differs according to the cultural and social context or according to the related 
monetary or non monetary aspects. 
The objective of this paper is to show that while social network helps getting a job, it is 
not necessarily a good job. Indeed, the type of jobs for whom individuals obtain information 
depends of the social status of the contact and the institutional (formal or informal) sector in 
which he practices. So in a context where informal economy is wide-spread, jobs about which 
one get informations emanate mainly from informal sector which is characterized by low level of 
wage, lack of social protection and job security. Besides, norms of trust and reciprocity, as well as 
the spontaneity of activities make difficult fixing of formal rules of hiring and dismissal. Thus our 
contribution is twofold. First, we show that the effect of social network on job quality differ with 
respect to the monetary aspect (wage) and non monetary aspect (social protection and job 
stability). Second, we provide the evidence that the contribution of social network to job quality 
differential varies according to gender and institutional sector (informal versus formal sector). 
This contribution helps shedding the light on the specificities of sub-Saharan African labor 
market as regard to developed countries. Indeed, Sub-Saharan countries are pervaded with 
informality to a greater extent. In the specific case of Cameroon, informal sector stands at 90.4% 
of total employment. This wide part of labour market is out of  the constraints of labor code and 
is de facto regulated by social norms such as trust and peer influence. In this context, there is a 
lack of formal channels of access to job (direct application, public and private agency, state 
selection) and the use of social network is wide-spread as a substitute to formal job search 
methods. Although informal job contacts may reduce informational asymmetry in the hiring 
process, it could increase labour market inequalities, lower job quality and well being. 
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As far as job quality is a multidimensional concept (L’horty et Fremigacci, 2005; Davoine et 
Erhel, 2007; Schokkaert & al, 2009), we distinguish between monetary aspect and non monetary 
aspect of job quality. As monetary aspect of job quality, we make use of wage following Pellizari 
(2004), while  to measure non monetary aspects of job quality, we build an ordered variable made 
off by job stability (fixed and permanent contract) and social protection (child benefits, pension, 
employer’s liability insurance). On methodological plan we run Heckman selection model and 
instrumental-variable regression in order to correct sample selection and endogenous bias. In fact 
the sample selection bias arises since there are no observable market wages for individuals who 
do not work. Then using the subsample of working individuals to draw conclusions for the entire 
population will lead to inconsistent estimates. Besides, the choice of using social network as job 
search methods can be considered as endogenous. Indeed, as underlined by Caliendo et al (2010), 
individuals with larger  networks use informal search channel more often and shift from formal 
search (direct application, employment agency, news papers) to informal search (use of network 
of friends and relatives). We analyze the relationship between social network and job quality 
using dataset of Cameroon’s survey on employment and informal sector (EESI2, 2005). This 
dataset is the only available dataset focusing exclusively on labor market outcomes and provides 
extensive informations on some aspects of job quality and job search behavior in Cameroon. 
 The outline of this article is as follows. Section 2 summarizes some evidences drawn from 
the literature on social network and job quality. Section 3 presents data used and some descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 describes the econometric modeling and the estimation strategy. Section 5 is 
devoted to results while Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Some literature’s evidences about social network and job quality  
While there is a wide range of literature focusing on social network and job search, the 
scarcity of papers linking social network and job quality is striking. However some papers have 
addressed the relationship between social networks and some aspects of job quality, namely wage 
(Pellizari, 2004; Delattre et Sabatier, 2007; Berardi, 2009; Caliendo et al, 2010) and occupational 
choice (Bentolila et al, 2010). In the same time, there is a wide body of literature discussing about 
job quality measurements. In the following review, we start by presenting some recent evidences 
about the measure of job quality. We follow by some empirical results about the relationship 
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between social networks and wage (monetary aspect of job quality). Finally, we focus on non 
monetary aspects of job quality with a specific emphasis on social protection and job security. 
2.1 Job quality measurement: Objective versus subjective approach 
Job quality is not a clearly defined concept and there is no single definition ( Davoine, 
2007; Grün, Hauser and Rhein, on 2008). So, diverse surrounding areas of definitions coexist and 
are a function of the approach adopted by the researcher. However, as defined by the European 
Commission, in its strategic document on employment (2000), Job quality is a relative concept 
which sends back to a job-worker-relationship and which takes into account both objective and 
subjective aspects. 
The subjective approach is based on the feeling of worker about its job and the related 
conditions. In this sense, job satisfaction is used as indicator of job quality. This approach is used 
in particular by Clark (2005). The justification for using job satisfaction scores is that they are 
strongly correlated with observable events such as quits, absenteeism or productivity. While 
widely used to measure global job quality, job satisfaction has been criticized for being too 
subjective (Rose, 2003). According to Kalleberg and Vaisey (2005), assessing the link between 
specific and overall job quality should recognize that different aspects lead worker to evaluate a 
job as good. In this vein, they provide an approach based on perceived satisfaction about 
economic benefits (earning, health insurance and pension) and non economic benefits (degree of 
autonomy and control, job security, opportunities of advancements) 
 Alternatively, one may use an objective approach to measure job quality via a set of 
objective job characteristics. In this sense, authors tend to value hours of work, the level of social 
protection and job protection, the relationship between family life and work and even the 
discrimination. This objective dimension agrees well with the notion of «decent work " raised and 
valued by the International Labour Organization (ILO) since 1999 and seems to be less subject to 
response bias3. This measure is widely used in empirical analysis. For instance Russel and al 
(2008) use hourly wage, probability of training and level of autonomy as a measure of job quality 
in the case of Ireland. The same approach is used by Stehrer, Ward and Macias (2009) for the EU 
member states. 
While there is no consensus about the relevance of each approach of measurement, 
Schokkaert & al (2009) pointed out the fact that objective measures are too objective as they 
neglect interindividual differences in preferences while subjective measures are too subjective as 
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they also reflect differences in aspirations. They propose an alternative measure of job quality in 
terms of equivalent income that does respect individual preferences, but rule out aspirations. 
Summing up, the issue of measurement of job quality stills a debated issue and is strongly 
shaped by methodological and theoretical considerations. This can explain why it is really difficult 
to address its relationship with major socioeconomic variables. 
2.2 Social network and monetary aspects of job quality: A specific emphasis on wages 
 One of the well studied aspects of job quality is certainly wage as it can be recorded by 
the number of related papers quoted in social science research network.  
According to Delattre et Sabatier (2007), social network mobilization influences wage 
through two kind of effects, namely informational effect and productivity or peer effect. As 
regard to information effect, networking speed up information exchange and screen available job 
opportunities. Therefore, networker users receive more job offers and firms receive more 
applications. Consequently, the equilibrium wage increase. According to productivity effect or 
peer effect, employer anticipates that workers hired through networking are monitored by 
workers in place and then display a higher productivity. Consequently they will propose them a 
higher wage. As a result, the global effect includes both the information effect and the 
productivity one, leading to a positive impact on wages. However, as pointed out by Pellizari 
(2004), there could be an ex post productivity effect due to some kind of mismatch. This would 
be the case if the employers have overestimated the productivity because of bad information 
given by network or failure of peer pressure. In the case of mismatch a positive effect of social 
network is observed in short run while in the long run one may observe a negative effect of social 
network on wages. 
 Informational effect and productivity effect have both been tested in the empirical 
literature. According to Pellizari (2004), using the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP), the use of social network does not lead to significantly better paid jobs. The same result 
is obtained by Delattre et Sabatier (2007) using French dataset and after controlling for 
endogenous bias. In the same vein Berardi (2009), using Senegal’s dataset find that social 
networks are likely to be adopted as hiring channel for unskilled jobs and result in wage penalty. 
However, some empirical results confirm the existence of informational effect. For instance, 
Kugler (2003), using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) find a positive return of 
social network. However, this effect becomes insignificant after controlling for employment 
sector. A similar study of Galeotti and Mueller (2005) support the evidence of a wage premium 
resulting from social network endowment.  
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 Finally there is no strong agreement about the effect of social network on wage as a non 
monetary aspect of job quality. However, the above studies provided some insight that could be 
more difficult to find about the non monetary aspects of job quality. 
2.3- Social network and non monetary aspects of job quality: A specific emphasis on 
social protection and job security 
While the effect of social network on social protection and job security has received little 
attention, it is however possible to suggest some channels by which this relationship can occurs. 
Concerning social protection, the use of social network in place of formal job search channels 
can favor the informalisation of hiring process, which put the worker out of the work legislation 
and de facto prevent him from the related advantages, namely the right to social protection and 
labor contract. In the inverse direction, social network could have a positive effect on job stability 
due to the fact that the more you have friends in a work place; the less is the probability to quit. 
This view is mainly supported by Quentin et al (2008) using data from a European household 
panel data (ECHP). They show that social network is a strong factor of immobility. In the same 
vein, Cingano and Rosalia (2006) using Italian dataset provide the evidence of a positive effect of 
social network on job stability. 
Finally, the effect of social network on job quality has received little attention in literature. 
Moreover there is no agreement about the suggested effect. 
3 Some stylized fact about social network and job quality in Cameroon 
The data used in this paper are drawn from EESI (2005) which is the survey on the 
employment and the informal sector in Cameroon. This survey has a national cover and was 
realized with 8540 households, that is 14606 individuals. The main purpose of this survey was to 
analyze several of labor market outcomes while comparing formal and informal sector. Here 
informal sector is defined as a sector made of by a set of activities and enterprises that are not 
recorded and not included in the national accountability. The sampling base is constituted by 
twelve zones of enumeration. A zone of enumeration is defined as a portion of the territory 
limited by visible details and containing between 700 and 1100 residents, that is 140 to 230 
households. The cities of Douala and Yaoundé being set apart, every region is subdivided into 
three strata: one urban stratum, one semi urban stratum and one rural stratum. The survey also 
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addresses the issue of job search. The related question is: How did you get your job? As far as the 
question is only asked to people who have already got a job, the size of sample is restricted to 
5531 individuals. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the main channels of job search. 
Table 1: Responses about job search methods 
Job search Methods Observations % 
Social Network (friends & relatives) 2363 42.72 
Direct Application 569 10.28 
Open Competition 420 7.60 
Others 2179 39.39 
Total 5531 100 
Source: EESI (2005) 
Responses about job search are classified in four categories: the use of social network (friends 
and relatives), direct application, open competition and others. The category “others” refers to all 
job search methods that are not recorded in the previous three categories. The main observation 
that can be drawn from table 1 is about the high rate of workers which have found a job through 
social network. This rate stand at 42% of total employment far above all the others means of 
search.  
Besides, the survey allows dealing with the issue of job quality. Here we focus mainly on wage, 
social protection and job security. This choice is made due to data availability and the low level of 
no responses. For instance, in this survey, we do not have information about discrimination, 
conciliation between job activities and family activities, degree of autonomy or job satisfaction. 
Table 2 and Table 3 below provide some descriptive statistics about wage, social protection and 
job security. 
Table 2: Variable of monetary aspects of job quality, logarithm of wage 
Log(wage)  Observations % 
[0.15     3.85[ 1677 30.22 
[3.85     4.54[ 1417 26.01 
[4.54     5.23[ 1296 23.79 
[5.23     5.92 [ 735 13.49 
[5.92     more [ 323 5.82 
Total 2428 100 
Source : EESI (2005) 
Table 2 presents the logarithm of wage divided in five classes starting from the low incomes to 
the high incomes. As it is shown by the title of this table, we use wage as a proxy measure of 
monetary aspects of job quality. In this choice, we follow Hamermesh (1997), Kalleberg and 
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Vaisey (2005). Table 2 exhibits a high wage inequality in the sense that the high income class 
represents only 6% of the total workers. As regard to non monetary aspects of job quality, we 
build an ordered variable linking social protection and job security. By Social protection, we mean 
child benefits, pension and employer’s liability insurance. Thus a worker is socially protected if he 
receives child benefits, pension and employer’s liability insurance. In this case the variable which 
captures social protection takes value 1. Otherwise this variable takes value 0. The question 
related to this variable is the following: “in your job do you receive fringe benefits such as 
pension, child benefits and employer’s liability insurance? Table 3 below provides descriptive 
statistics about this variable. 
Table 3: Responses about social protection 
Binary variable of social protection Observations % 
Protected 638 13.05 
Not protected 4250 86.95 
Total 4888 100 
Source : EESI (2005) 
Job security is measured in term of contract. The related question is: “do you have an 
employment contract?” This question is not an open one because the respondent have to choose 
between four modalities: No contract, oral contract, fixed term contract and permanent contract. 
Certainly the less known is the second modality which refers to an informal agreement between 
worker and employer. This kind of contract is mainly encountered in agriculture (piece-workers) 
and in the building trade. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics about this question. 
Table 4: Responses about job security 
Multinomial variable of job security Observations % 
No contract 910 29.20 
Oral contract 1031 33.08 
Fixed term contract 323 10.36 
Permanent contract 852 27.34 
Total 3116 100 
Source : EESI (2005) 
On the basis on these two variables, we build an ordered variable combining all the modalities 
recorded. This ordered variable ranges from 0 when worker does not receive social protection 
and have signed no contract (low job quality) to 7 when worker receive social protection and 
have a permanent contract (high job quality). The idea behind this classification is twofold. First 
in sub-Saharan African context, Cameroon to be specific, there is a lack of social net that could 
help people to improve their human capital (health and education), save more and build for the 
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future. Most of the time, job are bad paid and instable so that people cannot save neither invest. 
Thus a job with social protection and permanent contract may help people to better manage their 
life, save more and invest. Second, building an ordered variable is like setting up priorities in 
terms of economic policies and help dealing with the embarrassing issue of informality. Indeed, 
to provide social protection, job stability and better paid job (respect of the minimum wage law) 
cannot be done without moving toward more formal activities. Table 5 presents descriptive 
statistics related to the ordered variable of non monetary aspects of job quality. 
Table 5: Ordered variable of non monetary aspects of job quality 
Ordered variable of job quality Observations % 
No social protection & no contract 810 33.36 
No social protection & oral contract 793 32.66 
No social protection & fixed  term contract 135 5.56 
No social protection & permanent contract 99 4.08 
Social protection & no contract  35 1.44 
Social protection & oral contract 80 3.29 
Social protection & fixed term contract 111 4.57 
Social protection & permanent contract 365 15.03 
Total 2428 100 
Source : EESI (2005) 
In this table, one may observe that workers without social protection and contract or without 
social protection but who have an oral contract represent more than 66% of the total 
employment. Besides, workers who benefit for social protection and a permanent contract 
represent only 15% of the total employment.  
Summing up, job of low quality are wide-spread in the Cameroonian labor market. Indeed, 
according to monetary aspect, the high income class represents only 5% of the total employment 
while workers who benefit at the same time for social protection and permanent contract 
represent only 15% of the total employment.  
At this stage, one may ask whether the users of social network while looking for a job have a 
better job quality than the non users. In order to answer this question, at least partly, we present 
some cross tables which exhibit the correlations between social network and job quality. Table 6 
presents the job quality differential with a specific emphasis on gender. Table 7 in the same sense 
exhibits the job quality differential with a specific emphasis on institutional sector (formal and 
informal). 
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Table 6: Job quality differential according to gender 
 Users of social network Non users of social network 
 Female Male Total Female Male Total 
Monetary dimension: 
-Log of wage (mean) 
4.85 4.75 4.79 4.86 4.96 4.92 
Non monetary dimension 
-Low job quality (%) 
-High job quality (%) 
 
58.36 
7.03 
 
30.06 
11.31 
 
39.81 
9.90 
 
33.18 
21.39 
 
15.34 
26.98 
 
20.47 
25.37 
Note: Low job quality corresponds to the modality “No social protection & no contract” 
while high job quality corresponds to the modality “social protection & permanent contract”4. 
Relative frequencies are in terms of respectively total female users (non users) of network, total 
male users (non users) of network and total users (non users) of social network. 
This table shows that the users of social network irrespective of monetary or non monetary 
aspect exhibit a lower job quality than the non users. Specifically, users of social network exhibit a 
low wage and are more numerous to be without social protection and without employment 
contract. According to gender, women are better paid than men among the users of social 
network while the inverse situation is observed among non users. As regard to non monetary 
dimension, men have a better job quality than women irrespective of the use or not use of social 
network. According to institutional sectors, Table 7 show that, while job quality is always better 
in the formal sector than in the informal sector, the non users of social networks also exhibit 
better job quality than users. 
Table 7: Job quality differential according to institutional sector (formal & informal) 
 Users of social network Non users of social network 
 Formal Informal Total Formal Informal Total 
Monetary dimension: 
-Log of wage (mean) 
4.88 4.60 4.79 4.97 4.64 4.92 
Non monetary dimension 
-Low job quality (%) 
-High job quality (%) 
 
32.55 
9.56 
 
39.30 
3.29 
 
36.31 
6.07 
 
14.28 
27.04 
 
29.16 
7.29 
 
20.47 
25.37 
Note: Low job quality corresponds to the modality “No social protection & no contract” 
while high job quality corresponds to the modality “social protection & permanent contract”. 
Relative frequencies are in terms of respectively total female users (non users) of network, total 
male users (non users) of network and total users (non users) of social network. 
Finally, one of the main observations drawn from descriptive statistics is that the users of social 
network are less likely to obtain a better job than the non users. This negative correlation 
between social network and job quality remain as regard to gender and institutional (formal and 
informal) sector. However, the fact that women who use social network are better paid than men 
leave open the possibility that social network may contribute to the reduction of gender wage 
gap. This is clearly stated by Goos and Salomons (2007). Goos and Salomons, using UK labor 
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force survey found that the use of social network reduces the gender wage gap by 1.9 percent 
point. 
4 The econometric evaluation of network’s effects on job quality 
In order to estimate the effect of social network on job quality, we follow three steps. First we 
provide an econometric modeling of the relationship between social network and job quality. In 
this vein we make use respectively of Heckman selection model and Ordered Logit model. 
Second, we evaluate the contribution of social network to job quality differential according to 
gender and institutional sectors. Finally, we discuss about instruments used in order to correct the 
endogenous bias. 
4.1 Modeling job quality 
4.1.1-Monetary aspect of job quality 
Consider a sample of hired individuals such that: 
1i i i iw X snδ α ε= + +   (1) 
Where w  is the wage of individual i , isn is the binary variable which takes 1 for the users of 
social networks. X is the set of exogenous variables. As mention above, there are two types of 
biases that must be taken into account while estimating equation (1). The first is due to sample 
selection bias and the second is related to the endogeneity of social network. In order to deal with 
the issue of endogeneity, we have to find appropriate instruments for social network (strongly 
correlated with sn  and orthogonal toε  ). Then we have the following linear projection: 
1 2i i i isn X Zδ δ µ= + +   (2) 
Where Z  is a set of excluded instruments? We discuss about the choice of instruments in a 
specific subsection. Now, to address the issue of selection bias, we estimate a Probit model of 
looking for a job and extract the inverse Mills ratio. More specifically, let lj be the choice of 
looking for a job, a binary variable which takes value 1 if the individual looks for a job or have 
worked at least one week before the survey and 0 otherwise. Then we have: 
1 2 3( , , , , , , )i i i ilj f X Z y δ δ δ υ=     (3) 
Where υ ∼  normal (0,1), y is a set of exogenous variables only present in equation (3). We 
estimate (3) and recover the inverse Mills ratio,  
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1 2 3
1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )
i i i
i i i
X Z yIMR
X Z y
ϕ δ δ δ
φ δ δ δ
+ +
=
+ +
⌢
  (4) 
ˆ
, 1..3m mδ =  are the maximum likelihood estimations of mδ ,ϕ  is a pdf  of a standardized normal 
distribution and φ  is its cumulative function ( cdf ). Now to get consistent estimation of (1), we 
estimate the following equation by 2SLS, using instruments ( ˆ,iZ IMR ) on the subsample for 
which we observe both w  and sn : 
1
ˆ
i i i i iw X sn IMRδ α γ ν= + + +   (5) 
X= [age, age2, primary, secondaryg, secondaryt, highe,], where age is the age of worker, age2 is 
the squared of age, primary refers to primary education, secondaryg refers to secondary general 
education, secondaryt refers to secondary technical education and highe refers to high education.  
4.2 Non monetary aspect of job quality 
Let suppose that non monetary aspect of job quality can be measured by an ordered variable 
which depends of social network and a set of exogenous variable such that: 
*
1 2i i iQ X snβ β η= + +   (6) 
*Q  is a latent variable such that  
 
  (7) 
Where j:1..7 is the number of modalities. T  is a threshold to be estimated. η  is iid 2(0, )ησ  with 
i
η
η
σ
∼ a logistic law such that: 
[ ] 1 1 2 1 2j ji ii T TX sn X snprob Q j
η η η η
β β β β
σ σ σ σ
+
   + +
= = Λ − − −   
      
 with 
1 2( )
1(.)
1 i i iX sne β β η− + +
Λ =
+
  (8) 
The final specification to be estimated is as follows: 
*
1
*
1
*
8
0  
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Q j if T Q T
if Q T
+
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
= ≤ <

>
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11 12 13 14 15
16 2
2 sec seci i i i i i
i i i
Q age age primary ondaryg ondaryt
highe sn
β β β β β
β β η
= + + + +
+ + +
       (9) 
In this equation, social network is also instrumented in order to correct the endogenous bias. We 
provide descriptive statistics about the variables used here below. 
Table 8 : Descriptive statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Age 4382 33.02305 10.99084 15 60 
Age2 4382 12.11293 7.873538 2.25 36 
Sex 4382 .573026 .4946949 0 1 
Married 4382 .2026472 .4020176 0 1 
Household 
size 
4382 5.75445 3.755109 1 29 
Fwork 
Fathst 
4382 
4382 
 0.70 
 0.06 
  0.45 
  0.24 
0 
0 
1 
1 
 
Religion 4382 .9650844 .1835869 0 1 
No primary 4382 .1104518 .3134879 0 1 
Primary 4382 .3352351 .4721264 0 1 
Secondaryg 4382 .2473756 .4315361 0 1 
Secondaryt 4382 .1702419 .3758881 0 1 
      
Highe 4382 .1366956 .3435649 0 1 
Social 
network 
4382 .4144226 .4926783 0 1 
Log of wage 4382 4.333298 1.05482 .2231435 7.600903 
Lj 4382 0.53 0.49 0 1 
 
4.2 The contribution of social network to job quality differential 
The purpose of this subsection is to evaluate the contribution of social network to job quality 
differential according to gender and institutional sector. For the sake of simplicity, we adopt a 
general presentation following Yun (2004). Suppose that we have a variable of job quality which 
is a function of a linear combination of independent variables such that: 
( )jobq F Vψ=  (10) 
F is a function which itself may be or may not be linear. jobq is a variable of job quality 
(monetary or non monetary). V is the K N×  matrix of independent variables and among which 
we have social network. Suppose that we have two groups A and B. In our context we first talk 
about men and women and after about Formal and informal sector. 
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The mean difference between A and B can be decomposed as  
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) (A B A A B A B A B Bjobq jobq F V F V F V F Vψ ψ ψ ψ   − = − + −     (11) 
Where ψˆ  is the estimated vector of coefficients from equation (10). The first component in 
bracket measures differences in observable characteristics (explained component) and the second 
component measures differences in coefficients (unexplained component). 
Following Even and Macpherson (1990; 1993), Yun (2005), the contribution of a variable k  to 
job quality differential in explained component is given as follows: 
ˆ( )
ˆ ˆ( ) ( )
ˆ( )
k k k
A B A
k A B B B
A B A
V VC F V F V
V V
ψψ ψ
ψ
 
−
 = −   
− 
   (12) 
Where kgV  is the mean of observations of the variable k  in the group g : A, B. ˆ
k
gψ  is the 
estimated coefficient of variable k  in group g .  
4.3 Discussion about the choice of instruments 
An important issue of the econometric test is about the endogeneity of social network. Indeed, 
the study explicitly allows for the possibility that network are not chosen randomly, but rather 
that some characteristics such as unobserved preferences or unobserved group characteristics 
determine the use of social network. Besides, the reverse causality between wage and social 
network can also lead to endogenous bias. In fact, it is possible that an increase in wage makes 
easier the development of new ties. Of course it becomes less costly to create all social events or 
circumstances that generate social interaction such as dinner and birth party. Another issue with 
the social network measure is the concern of measurement error. This problem is common to 
survey data and may be explained by the fact that sometime the surveyed think that to admit 
using friends and relatives is like confessing that one has not the qualifications required for the 
job. For all the reasons quoted above, we need strong and valid instrument in order to avoid 
inconsistent estimates. We use the size of household as an instrument of social network. The idea 
behind this choice is the following: most of household in sub-Saharan African countries is made 
off by a large number of members. This generates social interactions and a network of 
solidarities. As argued by Putnam (2000), the high-density living increases social capital and thus 
social interactions. This argument is in line with sociological literature (Fischer, 1982; Coleman, 
1988, 1990) which argue that people living in large areas have a good deal of choice in 
constructing their social network and can seek out others with similar values and lifestyle. 
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Besides, living in a household with a large number of members does not only increase social 
interaction, but also allow each member to benefit for the social network of others. In the same 
vein, Fischer (1982) clearly states that most adults encounter peoples through their families. 
Using a survey on personal network in Toulouse (France), Grossetti (2005) shows that more than 
42% of friends are found through family. Moreover, Brueckner and Largey (2006) show that 
social network is an increasing function of population density while Wahba and Zenou (2004) use 
the latter as a proxy of social network. At the level of household this result can hold in the sense 
that persons living in larger households have high alternatives for exchange within the household 
and are able to benefit for external support through the network of each member of the 
household. Besides, the size of the household is exogenous in most empirical analysis. Indeed 
even if the size of household may change over the time, this change is not easy predictable. 
On the methodological plan, we check whether the instrument chosen is weak or not. Indeed, if 
the instrument is weak, the coefficient of social network will be weakly identified and the 
estimates biased [(Dufour ( 1997; 2003), Staiger and Stock ( 1997), Doko and Dufour (2008)]. We 
first run the simple Fisher test on the excluded instrument in the first stage regression [see 
equation (2)]. Here we have only one exclusion restriction, namely household size. The result is 
presented in table 10 and shows a F-statistic of 24.94. This value is sufficiently high at the level of 
1% so that we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instrument. Moreover, we run the weak 
instrument test proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). This test also confirms the rejection of the 
null hypothesis as far as the Cragg-Donald Wald test F statistic is 34.60 and always above the 
critical values. 
5 Results 
This section provides the results of the impact of social network on job quality. First we 
present the results of both Heckman and ordered Logit estimation. Second, we present the 
results of the decomposition of job quality differential according to gender and institutional 
sectors. Finally, we check the robustness of our estimates as regard to the change of instruments 
and the introduction of a variable which captures labor market structure (formal versus informal 
sector).  
5.1 The effect of social network on job quality 
 The results of the estimation of the effects of social network on job quality are presented 
in Table 10 and 11 in Appendix. In table 10, we present the effect of social network on monetary 
aspect of job quality captured by the logarithm of wage. Columns (1) and (2) show both OLS and 
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Heckman two step estimates while the column (5) presents 2SLS regression. The results suggest 
that social network have a positive effect on monetary aspect of job quality. Indeed, the users of 
social network obtain a premium of 1.53 point percentage of the average wage. This result differs 
from what obtained by Delattre et Sabatier (2007) on French data and also from those of Berardi 
(2009). However, this positive effect can be explained by the information effect as pointed out by 
Delattre et Sabatier (2007). In fact in context of job scarcity and when the main job search 
method consist in using social network (42% of job seekers), the information effect is greater 
than the productivity effect. Moreover, the productivity effect is less relevant in the context of a 
widespread of informal activities. In table 11, we present the effects of social network on non 
monetary aspect of job quality. As explained in section 3, this variable is an ordered combination 
of social protection and job security. Column (1) shows the ordered Logit estimates while column 
(3) presents 2SLS estimates. The results suggest that social network has a negative effect on non 
monetary aspect of job quality. There are two possible explanations of this finding. First, in the 
context of wide-spread of informal activities, the labor code which is supposed to regulate the 
labor market and to guarantee job quality is not applicable. Besides, in a context of scarcity of 
jobs and in which most of activities are low value-added activities, there is a trade-off between 
information effect and productivity effect. In other words, job seekers prefer to get a job even 
though this job is a low quality one than stay unemployed. In the same vein employers use this 
disequilibrium between labor supply and labor demand to reduce labor costs. 
5.2 The effect of social network on job quality differential 
Table 12 presents the decomposition of job quality differential according to gender and 
institutional sectors. We follow two objectives in this line. First, we evaluate the contribution of 
social network to job quality differential between men and women. Second, we evaluate the 
contribution of social network to job quality differential between formal sector and informal 
sector. Columns (1) and (2) show the contribution of explanatory variable to the wage 
differential. The results show that while social network has no effect on formal-informal wage 
differential, it contributes to the reduction of gender wage gap. In fact, it represents 0.7% of the 
explained wage gap. This result is in line with those of Goos and Salomons (2007). Columns (3) 
and (4) present the contribution of explanatory variables to job quality differential as regard to 
non monetary aspect. According to these results, social network contributes to the explained 
differential between formal sector and informal sector while it has no effect on gender 
differences. In this case, the magnitude of the effec represents 0.9% of explained differential. 
Summing up, the obtained results show that while social network contributes to the explained 
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wage differential between men and women, according to the non monetary aspect, it only 
contributes to the explained differential between formal sector and informal sector.  
5.3 Robustness check 
We perform two robustness checks. The first one consists to see whether the results 
change while controlling for institutional sectors (formal sector/informal sector). Tables 13 and 
14 present our findings. They suggest that the effects of social network are robust to the account 
of the dual structure of labour market in the case of wage. However, unsurprisingly, the results 
are not robust in the case of non monetary aspect (combination of social protection and job 
stability). The second robustness check consists in introducing additional instruments for social 
networks. Two variables are used in this vein. The first variable, named “fwork” is a binary 
variable which takes value 1 if the worker’s father has a job and 0 otherwise. Indeed we expect 
that the job seekers of whom the father has a job are more likely to benefit from informational 
effect than those of whom the father is jobless. The second variable, named “fathst” is a binary 
variable which takes value 1 if the worker’s father is senior executive and 0 otherwise. In this 
case, we expect that job seeker of whom the father is senior executive benefit as well for 
informational effect as for the influence. Table 15 and 16 present the results. We present both the 
2SLS model and the treatment effect model. Indeed we presume that fathst and fwork which are 
possible instrument of social network are not been able to pass the weak instrument test due to a 
kind of misspecification. In fact the 2SLS first step regression (see Table 10 column 4) is a linear 
regression when the endogenous variable (social network) is a binary variable. In this case the 
treatment effect model is useful due to the fact that the first step regression is a Probit one.  The 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the effect of social network remains whatever the instrument 
of social network. However, when we look at the first step regression (see Table 17, columns 1 
and 3), only Fwork is correlated to the variable of social network. But the coefficient of the 
household size remains significant. 
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6 Concluding remarks 
The idea of job quality is a recurrent theme in the empirical literature of labor economic. 
While the main focus is about the better way to measure job quality, little have been done to link 
this concept with a wide set of economic variables. While there is an increasing literature about 
social network and their effects on labour market, it seems useful to know whether the recorded 
positive effect of social network on job remain robust if one put an emphasis on quality. 
The main contribution of this paper is to provide the evidence according to which, while 
social network helps getting a job, it is not necessarily a good job. In fact, using dataset of 
Cameroonian survey on employment and informal sector (EESI, 2005), we provide an evidence 
of a mixed effect of social network on job quality. Making the difference between monetary 
aspects of job quality (captured by wage) and non monetary aspect of job quality (captured by a 
combination of social protection and job security), we found that, as regard to monetary aspects, 
social network has a positive effect on job quality. However, according to the non monetary 
aspect, the effect of social network on job quality is negative. Besides, the results show that social 
network has a significant, but not substantial effect on job quality differential according to gender 
and institutional sectors. 
These results are robust to the change of the instruments of social network and to various 
specifications.  
The bottom line of this paper is that social network has a significant effect on job quality. 
However, this effect differs according to monetary aspect and non monetary aspect.  
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 Appendix 
Table 9 : Glossary 
Variables Description 
      
Age Age of the labour force 
Age2 Age squared 
Sex Dummy variable which takes 1 for male and 0 for female 
Married Dummy variable of marital status : 1 for married people and 0 otherwise 
Household 
size 
Number of people living in the household 
Fwork 
Fathst 
Dummy variable: 1 if the father’s worker has a job and 0 otherwise 
Dummy variable:1 if the father’s worker is senior executive and 0 otherwise 
Religion Dummy variable :1 if the surveyed is Christian or Muslim and 0 otherwise 
Primary Dummy variable : 1 if the individual has the level of primary school and 0 
otherwise 
Secondaryg Dummy variable :1 if the individual has the level of secondary general school 
and 0 otherwise 
Secondaryt Dummy variable :1 if the individual has the level of secondary technical school 
and 0 otherwise 
      
Highe Dummy variable : 1 if the individual has attend to  university and 0 otherwise 
Social 
network 
Dummy variable : 1 if the individual has used friends and relatives while looking 
for a job and 0 otherwise 
Log of wage Logarithm of wage 
Formal Dummy variable :1 if the worker evolves in the formal sector and 0 if the 
worker evolves in the informal sector 
Lj Dummy variable: 1 if the individual looks for a job or have worked at least one 
week before the survey and 0 otherwise 
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Table 10: Job quality regressions: monetary aspect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    2SLS first 
step 
2SLS 
 OLS Heckman Heckman first 
step 
  
DependentVariable Log(wage) Log(wage) Lj Social 
network 
Log(wage) 
      
Age -0.00281 0.0845*** 0.223*** -0.0569*** 0.0333*** 
 (0.00850) (0.0125) (0.00900) (0.00579) (0.0123) 
Age squared 0.000185 -
0.000879*** 
-0.00271*** 0.000587*** -0.000109 
 (0.000119) (0.000162) (0.000128) (7.46e-05) (0.000151) 
Sex   0.536***   
   (0.0397)   
No education   0.647***   
   (0.0720)   
Primary education 0.669*** 0.708*** 0.684*** 0.0194 0.601*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0534) (0.0561) (0.0254) (0.0630) 
Secondaryt 1.079*** 1.035*** 0.357*** 0.0885*** 0.971*** 
 (0.0587) (0.0595) (0.0605) (0.0285) (0.0724) 
Secondaryg 0.890*** 0.794*** 0.288*** 0.0787*** 0.835*** 
 (0.0557) (0.0566) (0.0553) (0.0272) (0.0660) 
Maried   -0.319***   
   (0.0468)   
Household size   -0.0255*** 0.0105***  
   (0.00438) (0.00210)  
Religion   0.0850   
   (0.0962)   
Social network 0.0584** 0.0852***   1.536*** 
 (0.0293) (0.0296)   (0.300) 
IMR  0.760***  -0.328***  
  (0.0805)  (0.0409)  
Constant 3.293*** 1.351*** -4.057*** 1.641*** 1.889*** 
 (0.150) (0.252) (0.187) (0.116) (0.330) 
      
Observations 4391 7040 7040 4422 4385 
R-squared 
Instrument F-stat 
Cragg-Donald Wald 
F-stat 
0.222   0.081 
 
 
24.94 
34.60 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. IMR is the 
inverse Mills ratio. The endogenous variable is Social network. Social network is 
instrumented by household size nd the inverse Mills ratio. The Cragg-Donald Wald F-stat of 
weak identification is compared to the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values[19.93(10%); 
11.59(15%); 8.75 (20%); 7.25 (25%)] 
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Table  11:  Job quality regression , non monetary aspect 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Non monetary job quality Social network Non monetary job quality 
 O LOGIT First step 2SLS 2SLS 
    
Social Network -0.767***  -4.354** 
 (0.0992)  (1.904) 
Age -0.0735* -0.0569*** 0.143*** 
 (0.0425) (0.00579) (0.0361) 
Age squared 0.00151*** 0.000587*** -0.00119** 
 (0.000564) (7.46e-05) (0.000596) 
Primary education 0.972*** 0.0194 1.043*** 
 (0.215) (0.0254) (0.302) 
Secondaryg 1.740*** 0.0787*** 1.289*** 
 (0.220) (0.0272) (0.293) 
Secondaryt 2.168*** 0.0885*** 1.916*** 
 (0.226) (0.0285) (0.292) 
High education 3.643*** 0.00300 2.737*** 
 (0.252) (0.0293) (0.445) 
IMR -2.366*** -0.328***  
 (0.273) (0.0409)  
Household size  0.0105***  
  (0.00210)  
Constant  1.641*** 0.470 
  (0.116) (1.402) 
    
Observations 1872 4422 1872 
R-squared  0.081  
Notes : Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 12: Contribution of social network to the job quality differential 
 Monetary aspect of job quality Non monetary aspect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Formal-informal 
difference 
Gender 
difference 
Formal-informal 
difference 
Gender 
difference 
Overall 
Difference 
Explained 
Unexplained 
 
0.33*** (7.53) 
0.18*** (7.91) 
0.14*** (3.33) 
 
0.07**  (2.32) 
-0.08** (-1.89) 
0.16*** (3.12) 
 
0.10 
0.07 
 
0.03 
0.02 
Explained 
Age 
Age2 
Social network 
Primary 
Secondaryg 
Secondaryt 
Highe 
IMR 
- 
-0.0009  (-0.24) 
-0.003    (-0.50) 
-0.002    (-1.09) 
-0.12***(-5.86) 
-0.007     (-0.56) 
  0.04***   (3.12) 
0.27*** (9.18) 
-0.004     (-0.60) 
 
-0.03       (-1.29) 
0.02        (1.51) 
0.006**  (1.94) 
-0.015      (-1.57) 
-0.02***  (-2.72) 
0.03***   (3.05) 
0.14***   (7.85) 
-0.22***  (-5.31) 
 
 -0.03        (-1.33) 
0.04           (1.51) 
0.009***   (2.88) 
-0.21***    (53.8) 
0.03***     (5.53) 
   0.08***    (17.21) 
   0.15***    (31.47) 
 
0.004      (0.84) 
0.008*    (1.82) 
0.0008    (1.08) 
-0.02       (1.28) 
-0.02*** (-4.00) 
0.03*      (1.87) 
0.02***  (5.76) 
Unexplained 
Age 
Age2 
Social network 
Primary 
Secondaryg 
Secondaryt 
Highe 
IMR 
 
-1.95*      (-1.85) 
0.99**     (2.10) 
-0.03        (-0.99) 
0.08*       (1.68) 
0.09          (1.58) 
0.07*        (1.65) 
0.05          (1.35) 
-0.21*      (-1.85) 
 
-4.64*** (-4.28) 
2.29*** (4.52) 
-0.05**  (-2.27) 
0.02      (0.75) 
0.06**   (2.31) 
0.02      (1.25) 
-0.003     (-0.22) 
-0.38***  (-2.83) 
  
Observations 2084 4835 1043 1872 
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses. ***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1. Linear decomposition is 
applied for monetary aspects while non linear decomposition is applied for non monetary 
aspects. 
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Table 13: Monetary aspect of job quality, controlling for formal and informal sector 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2SLS 2SLS first step 2SLS 
DependentVariable Log(wage) Social network Log(wage) 
    
Household size  0.0133***  
  (0.00316)  
Inverse Mills ratio  -0.358***  
  (0.0620)  
Age 0.0333*** -0.0663*** 0.00487 
 (0.0124) (0.00977) (0.0237) 
Age squared -0.000109 0.000718*** 0.000308 
 (0.000152) (0.000134) (0.000312) 
Primary education 0.601*** 0.0916** 0.349*** 
 (0.0660) (0.0448) (0.135) 
Secondaryg 0.835*** 0.190*** 0.475*** 
 (0.0682) (0.0460) (0.139) 
Secondaryt 0.971*** 0.189*** 0.520*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0476) (0.152) 
High education 1.944*** 0.195*** 1.226*** 
 (0.0778) (0.0535) (0.164) 
Formal  0.0729** -0.177 
  (0.0354) (0.108) 
Informal  0.109*** -0.301*** 
  (0.0336) (0.107) 
Social Network 1.536***  1.924*** 
 (0.302)  (0.452) 
Constant 1.889*** 1.616*** 2.645*** 
 (0.334) (0.191) (0.510) 
    
Observations 4385 1982 1959 
R-squared 
Instrument F-stat 
 
24.94 
0.078  
17.76 
Note : Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The endogenous 
variable is social network. Social network is instrumented by the size of household and the 
inverse Mills ratio. 
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Table 14: Non monetary aspect of job quality, Controlling for formal and informal sector 
 (1) (2) 
 2SLS 2SLS 
Independent 
Variable 
Non monetary 
job quality 
Non monetary 
job quality 
   
Social network -4.354** -1.268 
 (1.904) (1.752) 
Age 0.143*** 0.160*** 
 (0.0361) (0.0478) 
Age squared -0.00119** -0.00174** 
 (0.000596) (0.000708) 
Primary education 1.043*** 0.462 
 (0.302) (0.343) 
Secondaryg 1.289*** 0.834** 
 (0.293) (0.374) 
Secondaryt 1.916*** 1.305*** 
 (0.292) (0.392) 
High education 2.737*** 2.516*** 
 (0.445) (0.347) 
Formal  0.668*** 
  (0.226) 
Informal  0.169 
  (0.205) 
Constant 0.470 -1.764 
 (1.402) (1.675) 
   
Observations 1872 967 
R-squared  0.259 
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Monetary aspect of job quality regression comparing various instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2SLS 2SLS Treatment effect 
Model 
Treatment effect 
model 
Dependent Variable Log(wage) Log(wage) Log(wage) Log(wage) 
     
Age 0.398 0.668 0.0674*** 0.0904*** 
 (0.532) (0.637) (0.0158) (0.0163) 
Age -0.00411 -0.00684 -0.000691*** -0.000955*** 
 (0.00548) (0.00650) (0.000187) (0.000204) 
Primary education 0.531 0.546 0.650*** 0.708*** 
 (0.345) (0.443) (0.0483) (0.0602) 
Secondaryg 0.397 0.340 0.887*** 0.932*** 
 (0.695) (0.689) (0.0540) (0.0647) 
Secondaryt 0.509 0.426 1.034*** 1.064*** 
 (0.912) (0.808) (0.0566) (0.0673) 
High education 1.820*** 2.102*** 1.888*** 1.953*** 
 (0.250) (0.554) (0.0581) (0.0712) 
Household size   0.0862*** 0.0856*** 
   (0.00453) (0.00518) 
Inverse Mills ratio 2.283 3.672 0.275*** 0.382*** 
 (2.563) (3.200) (0.101) (0.108) 
Social network 6.184 12.12 0.608*** 0.876*** 
 (10.41) (13.34) (0.190) (0.140) 
     
Constant -8.114 -16.87 1.188*** 0.555 
 
Instrument F-stat 
(16.08) 
0.22 
(19.94) 
0.74 
(0.386) (0.360) 
 
Log Likelihood  
LR test p>chi2 
  -6090.31 
[0.0006] 
-8673.38 
[0.05] 
Observations 4383 3148 4383 3148 
   Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Social network is 
instrumented respectively by Fwork (which takes 1 if the worker’s father has a job and 0 
otherwise) and Fathst (which takes 1 if the worker’s father is senior executive and 0 otherwise). 
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Table 16:   Non monetary aspect of job quality regression with various instruments 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dependent 
Variables 
Non monetary 
job quality 
Non monetary 
job quality 
Non monetary 
job quality 
    
Social network -4.354** -13.90 -7.755** 
 (1.904) (9.143) (3.009) 
Age 0.143*** 0.192* 0.158*** 
 (0.0361) (0.110) (0.0528) 
Age squared -0.00119** -0.00263 -0.00174** 
 (0.000596) (0.00203) (0.000888) 
Primary 1.043*** 1.722* 1.275*** 
 (0.302) (0.977) (0.447) 
secondaryg 1.289*** 2.068** 1.459*** 
 (0.293) (1.035) (0.431) 
secondaryt 1.916*** 2.509*** 2.026*** 
 (0.292) (0.902) (0.427) 
High education 2.737*** 1.415 2.147*** 
 (0.445) (1.558) (0.679) 
Constant 0.470 6.284 2.760 
 (1.402) (6.107) (2.190) 
    
Observations 
Instrument F-stat 
1872 
24.94 
1359 
0.22 
1871 
0.74 
Notes : Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: Instrumentation equations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS Probit Probit 
Dependent 
Variable 
Social network Social network Social 
network 
Social 
network 
     
Household size 0.0105*** 0.00905*** 0.0294*** 0.0238*** 
 (0.00210) (0.00251) (0.00578) (0.00677) 
Fwork 0.00733  0.0399  
 (0.0158)  (0.0433)  
IMR -0.328*** -0.311*** -0.887*** -0.833*** 
 (0.0409) (0.0483) (0.113) (0.132) 
Age -0.0570*** -0.0528*** -0.1505*** -0.1409*** 
 (0.00579) (0.00693) (0.0166) (0.0196) 
Age squared 0.000588*** 0.000539*** 0.00151*** 0.0014*** 
 (7.46e-05) (8.99e-05) (0.000216) (0.000257) 
Primary 0.0194 0.00934 0.0637 0.0426 
 (0.0254) (0.0304) (0.0684) (0.0795) 
Secondaryg 0.0786*** 0.0529 0.214*** 0.141 
 (0.0272) (0.0322) (0.0743) (0.0844) 
Secondaryt 0.0888*** 0.0540 0.244*** 0.141 
 (0.0284) (0.0335) (0.0774) (0.0800) 
High education 0.00273 -0.0168 -0.0217 -0.0962 
 (0.0293) (0.0348) (0.0846) (0.0983) 
Fathst  0.0410  0.411*** 
  (0.0475)  (0.119) 
Constant 1.636*** 1.581*** 2.982*** 2.876*** 
 (0.117) (0.138) (0.331) (0.386) 
     
Log Likelihood   -8389.18 -6090.31 
Observations 4420 3171 4383 3148 
R-squared 0.081 0.074   
   Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
